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PRESIDENTIAL PRIMACY
AMIDST DEMOCRATIC DECLINE
Ashraf Ahmed∗ & Karen M. Tani∗∗
Especially I want to show that it could be different, that it was different, and that there are alternatives.
— Natalie Zemon Davis1
Fifty years ago, when the Harvard Law Review asked Professor
Harry Kalven, Jr., to take stock of the Supreme Court’s 1970 Term,2
Kalven faced a task not unlike Professor Cristina Rodríguez’s. That
Term’s Court had two new members, Justices Harry Blackmun and
Warren Burger. The Nixon Administration was young, but clearly bent
on making its own stamp on American law, including via the Supreme
Court.3 Kalven thus expected to see “dislocations” when he reviewed
the Court’s recent handiwork.4 He reported the opposite. Surveying a
Term that included such cases as Palmer v. Thompson,5 Younger v.
Harris,6 Boddie v. Connecticut,7 and Citizens to Preserve Overton Park
v. Volpe,8 Kalven noted significant doctrinal developments, but ultimately found “the continuities” more striking than “the discontinuities.”9
Perhaps he hoped to assuage fears that the Court was becoming “a political agency and nothing more.”10 In any event, he underscored the
Court’s institutional “stamina” and the “powerful pressure towards continuity.”11
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
∗ Ashraf Ahmed, J.D., is an Academic Fellow and Lecturer in Law at Columbia Law School
and a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at Columbia University.
∗∗ Karen M. Tani, J.D./Ph.D. (History), is the Seaman Family University Professor at the
University of Pennsylvania. For helpful conversations and critiques, the authors thank Jessica
Bulman-Pozen, Cary Coglianese, Erin Delaney, Nate Holdren, Lev Menand, David Pozen, Nicholas
Parrillo, and Noah Rosenblum. Janice Jiang provided valuable research assistance. All errors are
our own.
1 Interview by Rob Harding & Judy Coffin with Natalie Zemon Davis (1981), in VISIONS OF
HISTORY 97, 114–15 (Henry Abelove et al. eds., 1983).
2 Harry Kalven, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1970 Term — Foreword: Even When a Nation Is at
War, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3 (1971).
3 See Transcript of the President’s Announcement on Two Nominees for Supreme Court, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 22, 1971), https://www.nytimes.com/1971/10/22/archives/transcript-of-the-presidentsannouncement-on-two-nominees-for.html [https://perma.cc/AA4G-NHS8].
4 Kalven, supra note 2, at 4.
5 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
6 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
7 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
8 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
9 Kalven, supra note 2, at 5.
10 Id. at 3.
11 Id. at 5.
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By contrast, Rodríguez’s Foreword emphasizes discontinuity — not
in the output of the Supreme Court from Term to Term but in the legal
and policy orientations of the executive branch as it has transitioned
from President Trump to President Biden and as it will transition to
other leadership in the future. In her telling, because the Court is, in
important respects, a political agency (although also something more),
she urges it not to impose undue impediments on Executive-led change.
We read Rodríguez’s Foreword as a compelling and nuanced defense
of presidential primacy (although, importantly, she does not claim that
exact term).12 She offers a description of the contemporary legal and
political landscape in which the inauguration of a new President sometimes initiates a political “regime change,” marked by Executive-led
efforts to make consequential changes in law and policy (that is, to instantiate a new “legal regime”).13 She then urges readers to be comfortable with both types of change — to accept that electoral victories bring
with them “control of the machinery that turns political visions into everyday realities” and, moreover, to want a government that can be nimble
and energetic, even when a new regime does not align with one’s personal preferences.14 Put simply, she offers a vision of contemporary
democratic governance in which “regime change,” emanating from the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
12 Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Supreme Court, 2020 Term — Foreword: Regime Change, 135
HARV. L. REV. 1 (2021). In places where she might have used the term “presidential primacy” (or
perhaps “presidential administration”), Rodríguez instead uses phrases like “the concerted effort by
executive officials to instantiate a new legal and political order,” id. at 9; an executive branch with
an “assertive orientation to [its] powers,” id.; and “executive policymaking,” id. at 90. Nevertheless,
she appears to accept as fact that “the President sits atop a massive administrative state with responsibilities for its supervision and forward motion,” id. at 58, and throughout she emphasizes the
value of an energetic presidency. We use the term “presidential primacy” to make clear how this
type of argument relates to long-running scholarly debates over who controls, and who ought to
control, the administration of federal law. We understand presidential primacy to refer to a family
of theories, including Rodríguez’s “regime change” and presidential administration, that are committed to presidential supremacy over the administrative state on pragmatic and democratic
grounds. We have no wish, however, to distort or take nuance from Rodríguez’s position and hope
we have not done so. We also want to distinguish Rodríguez’s model, and presidential primacy
more broadly, from unitary executive theories, which take a more sweeping view of executive power.
In administrative law, these theories tend to focus on the constitutional foundations of presidential
power over agencies, with some exceptions. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE,
THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 10 (2010) (arguing on functional grounds); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute
the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 549 (1994) (advancing a constitutional argument). Whereas unitarians
typically turn to constitutional text and history to justify their position, presidential primacy depends on underlying norms about executive power, namely strong assumptions about the scope of
executive power absent explicit congressional authorization. See Ashraf Ahmed, A Theory of
Constitutional Norms, 120 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 29–31) (on file with
the Harvard Law School Library) (explaining the nature and function of constitutional norms).
13 Rodríguez, supra note 12, at 16–17.
14 Id. at 109.
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executive branch, is both what we have and what we need.15 That one
regime will undo some of the work of a previous regime is not an argument against presidential primacy,16 but rather an argument in its favor.
Our Response makes one major point: however appealing we may
find Rodríguez’s argument from a pragmatic and presentist perspective,
we should recognize that it exists amidst — and sometimes draws its
appeal from — troubling historical developments in the workings of our
democratic institutions. The urgency of our current problems, the relative ease of government by “pen” and “phone”17 — these are reasons to
be attracted to Rodríguez’s vision, but they are also arguably symptomatic of structural failings. They should be recognized as such, alongside a recognition of forces that now threaten democracy itself.
A broader theoretical and historical view makes this clear.
Our Response proceeds as follows. Drawing on Rodríguez’s frequent
references to democracy, Part I seeks to bring her theory of democracy
into sharper relief. How, in theory, does her version of presidential primacy further or embody democracy? Also, how does the theory map
onto what we have seen thus far of presidential primacy? This exercise
leads us to conclude that the greatest appeal of Rodríguez’s model is
probably not its democratic justification (although that certainly
helps) — but rather something else. Diagnosing the exact nature of that
“something else” goes beyond the scope of this Response and is sure to
consume scholarly energies for years to come. But we hope the second
Part of our Response contributes to this effort, in a way that also connects fruitfully to the focus of this law review issue. Part II discusses
two historical developments that implicate the Supreme Court and that
shed light on the rise, and limits, of presidential primacy: (1) the declining viability of private enforcement of federal law, a modality of enforcement that, since the late 1960s, Congress has often preferred to exclusively public enforcement; and (2) the conservative drift of federalism
doctrine, made more dramatic by developments in constitutional rights
doctrine. To be clear, these are not the only historical developments that
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
15 Although Rodríguez portrays “executive governance as necessary to fulfilling the goals of
democratic politics,” id. at 10, she does not consign Congress to irrelevance. She recognizes that
statutes constrain executive branch choices; that Executive-led regime change will be most successful if it includes a “legislative strategy,” id. at 54; and that “[t]he service of democracy revolves
around respect for and deference to the legislature,” id at 64.
16 But see Blake Emerson & Jon D. Michaels, Abandoning Presidential Administration: A Civic
Governance Agenda to Promote Democratic Equality and Guard Against Creeping
Authoritarianism, 68 UCLA L. REV. 104, 114 (2021) (criticizing presidential administration on account of how easily a President can undo the work of their predecessor); Jerry L. Mashaw & David
Berke, Presidential Administration in a Regime of Separated Powers: An Analysis of Recent
American Experience, 35 YALE J. ON REGUL. 549, 608–10 (2018) (suggesting that, to the extent
presidential administration now entails the “Sisyphean doing and undoing of the same policies,” id.
at 610, that is a strike against its “normative worth,” id. at 608).
17 Tamara Keith, Wielding a Pen and a Phone, Obama Goes It Alone, NPR (Jan. 20, 2014, 3:36
AM), https://www.npr.org/2014/01/20/263766043/wielding-a-pen-and-a-phone-obama-goes-it-alone
[https://perma.cc/3P7U-TJXB].
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merit inclusion in a conversation about presidential primacy; they may
not even be the most important ones. But they are ones that are visible
in the Supreme Court’s 2020 Term, that help contextualize the model of
governance we see at the heart of the Foreword, and that the Foreword
touches on only lightly. Part III takes up the historical development that
Rodríguez surfaces in her Coda: a declining judicial commitment to the
right to vote, paired with persistent efforts to diminish or overwhelm
the political agency of the nonwhite and the nonwealthy. In our view,
this development is worrisome enough to deserve center stage in any
conversation about American governance — lest we look up one day
and find that the nation’s democratic foundation has eroded beyond
recognition and repair. Ultimately, we want the good governance that
Rodríguez’s model promises, but we need democracy,18 and at this juncture, democracy may require much more than an empowered and energetic executive branch.
I. THE DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND PRACTICE
OF RODRÍGUEZ’S MODEL OF GOVERNANCE
Rodríguez’s image of enterprising and enlightened executive branch
leadership has long been a compelling one, especially during periods of
congressional stalemate.19 Yet the attraction of such leadership is not
simply the promise of competent administration, Rodríguez emphasizes.
Undergirding her vision is an argument about democracy. Indeed, democracy and its cognates appear over one hundred times in the
Foreword. In her own words, she portrays “executive governance as
necessary to fulfilling the goals of democratic politics.”20 While acknowledging the pull of “political stare decisis,”21 she urges readers to
understand assertive Executive-led changes in law and policy as vindications of “two basic principles” of democracy: (1) that the government
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
18 By democracy, we mean government by majority rule (with constitutional limitations) with
regular, fair, and free elections and regular, peaceful transitions of power. These are necessary
conditions, not sufficient ones.
19 See, e.g., FRANK J. GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION 118–19 (1900) (underlining the unique role of the presidency in party politics); WOODROW WILSON,
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 67–68, 215 (1908) (justifying presidential leadership on the basis of a national constituency); Elena Kagan, Presidential
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2246 (2001) (announcing an “era of presidential administration”); Noah A. Rosenblum, The Antifascist Roots of Presidential Administration, COLUM. L.
REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 4–6) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (tracing the
intellectual history of early twentieth-century presidentialism); Cass R. Sunstein, The Most
Knowledgeable Branch, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1607, 1608–11 (2016) (arguing for wide presidential
discretion due to the executive branch’s epistemic advantages).
20 Rodríguez, supra note 12, at 10; see also id. at 8 (arguing that by charting a new course, a
presidential administration “ultimately . . . help[s] to sustain a connection between government and
democratic politics”).
21 Id. at 77.
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should be made to “work for the people” and (2) that members of the
polity should “accept the outcomes of democratic processes, even when
they are outcomes with which [we] disagree.”22
This Part of our Response takes seriously Rodríguez’s invocations of
democracy. We begin by searching out her underlying theory of democracy and highlighting how it supports her vision of governance. We
then compare theory to practice. Based on what we have seen of presidential primacy, how strong are its democratic bona fides? We emerge
not fully convinced that democracy can bear the weight the Foreword
puts on it. This preliminary assessment lays the foundation for Part II,
where we seek a more historically grounded understanding of the
model’s appeal and limits.
A. Democratic in Theory?
Those who have followed scholarly debates over presidential
primacy will recognize a well-worn path between ideas about executive
branch leadership and the idea of democracy.23 The most common
means of connecting presidential primacy to democracy begins by depicting the administrative state as a “headless fourth branch.”24 The
next move is to observe that regulation often involves political decisions
as much as it does technocratic ones.25 Because the President represents
the only branch with the requisite agility and national constituency to
guide these decisions, the White House must lead.26
Rodríguez wisely avoids the weakest element of that chain — the
idea of the President’s national constituency27 — and offers instead her
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
22
23

Id. at 9.
This was not always the case. See generally JOHN DUNN, DEMOCRACY: A HISTORY (2005).
And there remain rare exceptions. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Beyond Originalism, THE
ATLANTIC (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/03/common-goodconstitutionalism/609037
[https://perma.cc/CCR7-MF4H]
(arguing
for
“common-good
constitutionalism”).
24 See PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE WITH
STUDIES OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 32, 40 (1937).
25 See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.
J. 451, 451–53 (1979); Lloyd N. Cutler & David R. Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process,
84 YALE L. J. 1395, 1395–97 (1975).
26 See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of Constitutional and Political Theory in
Administrative Law, 64 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1985). In sketching the democratic justifications for
presidential administration, we do not intend, of course, to suggest that these are the only
justifications.
27 In Rodríguez’s words, the “representativeness of the presidency of a national polity” is “a
contested and incomplete formulation.” Rodríguez, supra note 12, at 63–64. The notion of a national constituency is dubious for a few reasons. First, minoritarian Presidents have become increasingly common and, given the skew of the Electoral College, likely will continue to be. See
Damon Linker, Opinion, The GOP’s Minority Rule, THE WEEK (July 20, 2018),
https://theweek.com/articles/785710/gops-minority-rule [https://perma.cc/YH7U-VFDG]. Second,
the President’s incentives do not always point toward adopting a more representative set of policy
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own, multipronged democratic justification of assertive Executive-led
governance. In our reading, she emphasizes effectiveness, tolerance for
competing views, and responsiveness. To preview our argument, we
conclude that although these are all democratic desiderata, only responsiveness offers the model significant democratic justification.
1. Effectiveness. — Democracies are routinely ineffective, at least as
measured by their ability to avoid crises,28 and they have often fielded
disagreement over what the standards for “effectiveness” should be.29
Moreover, even if we could agree on metrics, it is not clear that effectiveness is an intrinsically democratic principle. One version of it is
simply technocratic: an effective government is one that successfully
uses the means at its disposal to achieve its desired ends.30 Possibly
Rodríguez is invoking effectiveness in the sense of utility: energetic
Executive-led governance produces better outcomes. But even if this
were true,31 it would not suggest that effectiveness makes a system more
democratic than an alternative. Indeed, if our priority is effectiveness,
we might prefer a different form of government altogether.
Effectiveness can easily point away from the United States and toward
Singapore.32
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
positions than the median member of Congress. Jide Nzelibe, The Fable of the Nationalist
President and the Parochial Congress, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1217, 1231–42 (2006).
28 See generally DAVID RUNCIMAN, THE CONFIDENCE TRAP: A HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS FROM WORLD WAR I TO THE PRESENT (2013).
29 Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Moral Disagreement in a Democracy, SOC. PHIL. &
POL’Y, Winter 1995, at 87, 87 (discussing how two approaches to democracy, procedural democracy and constitutional democracy, emphasize different values).
30 Rodríguez’s emphasis on good governance mirrors other increasingly prominent arguments
in favor of an energetic technocracy, such as central banks taking on a more direct role in combating
climate change. See, e.g., Lev Menand, Administering the Banking System: Towards a Theory of
the Federal Reserve 3–14 (Oct. 17, 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Harvard Law
School Library) (reviewing such arguments).
31 For reasons to doubt this proposition, see as examples PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S
NIGHTMARE: HOW EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2009); and
David L. Noll, Administrative Sabotage, 120 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (on file with the
Harvard Law School Library).
32 See Graham Allison, The Lee Kuan Yew Conundrum, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 30, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/03/lee-kuan-yew-conundrum-democracysingapore/388955 [https://perma.cc/HZ9J-TUNV]. Some theorists argue that democracy is the best
form of governance because it pools and uses knowledge in ways that lead to better outcomes —
that is, they claim that democracy is the most effective. See, e.g., DAVID M. ESTLUND,
DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK 6–9, 15–18 (2007) (arguing that
the justification of democracy partly depends on its epistemic advantages). See generally ROBERT
E. GOODIN & KAI SPIEKERMANN, AN EPISTEMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (2018); HÉLÈNE
LANDEMORE, DEMOCRATIC REASON: POLITICS, COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE, AND THE
RULE OF THE MANY (2012). But these arguments only buttress our point: they justify democracies
on the grounds that they are effective; they do not suggest that effectiveness somehow makes a
system more democratic than an alternative. To what extent effectiveness can promote democracy
is an important empirical question. Historical scholarship on administrative law and American
political development suggests that ineffective administration can hinder democratization. See, e.g.,
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2. Tolerance. — Central to Rodríguez’s defense of concerted executive action is the norm of “mutual tolerance”: her model envisions
“‘[t]reating rivals as legitimate contenders for power,’ which must entail
accepting the legitimacy of their exercise of power.”33 “Mutual tolerance” clearly sustains democracy, even if it does not help constitute it:
while democracy can involve and indeed benefit from agonistic politics,34 a prolonged friend-enemy distinction35 can endanger the peaceful
transition of power that democracy promises.36 We also see democratic
value in the thicker notion of tolerance that Rodríguez invokes —
whereby a new administration’s critics treat the day-to-day work of regime change as legitimate and its formal output as authoritative (if also
legally contestable). What is less clear is the relationship between mutual tolerance and the vision of governance that Rodríguez advocates.
Do energetic, Executive-led changes in law and policy produce mutual
tolerance? In our view, successful “regime change” might be a sign that
a given democracy is mutually tolerant, but no causal relationship is
clear (whereas political and legal regime change does occur alongside
intolerance and distrust37).
3. Responsiveness. — This idea entails a continuing correspondence
between politics and administration. Rodríguez argues that by “weaving political judgment into administration and all that [it] entails,” her
model of governance offers “the best way to consistently sustain a relationship between the democratic sphere and state governance.”38 This
argument reprises a key element of the traditional argument for presidential control — the notion that administration is itself political39 —
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
AJAY K. MEHROTRA, MAKING THE MODERN AMERICAN FISCAL STATE: LAW, POLITICS,
AND THE RISE OF PROGRESSIVE TAXATION, 1877–1929, at 8-10 (2013); NICHOLAS R.
PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT, 1780–1940, at 2–4 (2013).
33 Rodríguez, supra note 12, at 9 n.33 (internal citation omitted) (quoting STEVEN LEVITSKY &
DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 212 (2018)).
34 See BONNIE HONIG, POLITICAL THEORY AND THE DISPLACEMENT OF POLITICS 2–3
(1993); ED WINGENBACH, INSTITUTIONALIZING AGONISTIC DEMOCRACY, at xi–xxi (2011);
Chantal Mouffe, Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?, 66 SOC. RSCH. 745, 745 (1999);
Reva B. Siegel, Community in Conflict: Same-Sex Marriage and Backlash, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1728,
1730 (2017).
35 See generally CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL (George Schwab trans.,
Univ. of Chi. Press 1996) (1932); CARL SCHMITT, THE CRISIS OF PARLIAMENTARY
DEMOCRACY (Ellen Kennedy trans., MIT Press paperback ed. 1988) (1923).
36 Adam Przeworski, Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense, in DEMOCRACY’S
VALUE 23, 23–55 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cordón eds., 1999).
37 See generally Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Essay, Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball,
118 COLUM. L. REV. 915 (2018).
38 Rodríguez supra note 12, at 65; see also id. at 64 (describing agency action as fundamentally
“driven by a principle of responsiveness, to changed circumstances and preferences”).
39 Advocates of presidential control in the late 1970s and 1980s, the era when modern presidential governance was forged, insisted that because regulation involved value choices, it required
greater political supervision of agencies. Professor Jerry Mashaw, for instance, famously argued for
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but puts it on firmer footing via evidence about how executive branch
actors do their jobs. A powerful example emerges in section II.A.2,
where Rodríguez draws on ongoing empirical work with Professor Anya
Bernstein to depict a vast, porous, and dynamic bureaucracy “responsive[] to evolving circumstances and public inputs on the ground, not
just or even primarily to center-directed mandates.”40 The political officials who lead these agencies “create venues for democratic politics and
agitation to inform administration and policymaking.”41 Such examples
show that presidential administration is responsive not only in the thin
sense of a President governing with an electoral mandate, but also in a
thicker sense, by virtue of the “political layer” of officials that interfaces
with affected communities and interest groups, gathers information, and
executes the law on the President’s behalf.
We are persuaded that responsiveness is an obvious, essential element of any democratic regime.42 For the earliest theorists of mass democracy, the correspondence between public opinion and legislation defined a regime as democratic.43 Later skeptics of democracy attacked
that linkage, questioning the very notion of “public opinion”44 or characterizing political parties as directed by elites and free from political
control.45 The pattern of debate underlines the importance of responsiveness to democracy.46
Yet responsiveness does not, on its own, amount to a theory of democracy.47 Insofar as responsiveness is important to Rodríguez’s model,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
broad statutory delegations to agencies that would allow administrators to make political decisions.
These delegations, when coupled with a presidential control, forged a link between public opinion
and agency action. Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political
Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 96 (1985) (“[T]he flexibility that is currently built into the
processes of administrative governance by relatively broad delegations of statutory authority permits a more appropriate degree of administrative, or administration, responsiveness to the voter’s
will than would a strict nondelegation doctrine.”).
40 Rodríguez, supra note 12, at 75.
41 Id. Rodríguez importantly notes that there are nearly 4,000 political appointees throughout
the agencies. Id. at 74 n.265.
42 See generally DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION (Adam
Prezworski et al. eds., 1999).
43 See generally GREGORY CONTI, PARLIAMENT THE MIRROR OF THE NATION:
REPRESENTATION, DELIBERATION, AND DEMOCRACY IN VICTORIAN BRITAIN (2019);
WILLIAM SELINGER, PARLIAMENTARISM (2019).
44 See generally WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION (1922).
45 See generally ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE
OLIGARCHICAL TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY (Eden Paul & Cedar Paul trans., The
Free Press 1968) (1911); GAETANO MOSCA, THE RULING CLASS (Hannah D. Kahn trans.,
McGraw-Hill Book Co. 1989) (1939); VILFREDO PARETO, THE MIND AND SOCIETY
(Arthur Livingston ed., Andrew Bongiorno & Arthur Livingston trans., Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1935)
(1916).
46 Even a minimalist conception of democracy, one that limits it to the regular and peaceful
alternation of power through elections, requires responsiveness. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER,
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 250–51 (1942); Przeworski, supra note 36, at 31–39.
47 See generally DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY (Stanford Univ. Press 3d ed. 2006)
(1987).
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it seems to matter either because we have an underlying expectation that
the administrative state be subject to a dynamic form of democratic
control (making it problematic if the model were not responsive) or because we think the presidential primacy model is more responsive —
more democratic — than some other model of governance that is compatible with our constitutional system. Is it?
We do not have an answer to this question — of whether presidential
primacy is more democratic than alternatives — but thanks to historical
and empirical work on modern administrative governance, it is possible
to offer some observations about presidential primacy in practice and
how it has conformed, or not, to democratic desiderata. We turn to that
task now. Again, our overarching goal is to gain a better understanding
of why energetic, Executive-led governance seems necessary at this moment and whether democracy supplies the answer.
B. Democratic in Practice?
Rodríguez has offered cogent examples of how, in practice, presidential primacy can serve democracy. We add to the picture another wellrecognized aspect of presidential primacy: centralized oversight of the
administrative state, animated by some version of cost-benefit analysis.
This is a feature that Rodríguez does not discuss in depth but certainly
acknowledges. In her account, centralized oversight of the administrative state gives the executive branch an “institutional advantage” that it
is unlikely to relinquish; likewise, she identifies cost-benefit analysis as
a “tenet” of “persistent presidentialism,” albeit one that might continue
to evolve.48 When we look at this nexus — of centralized oversight and
cost-benefit analysis — is presidential primacy democratic in practice?
Other scholars have ably chronicled the rise of centralized oversight,
the structures that support it, and the frameworks that animate it.49 The
following points seem uncontroversial and will suffice for what follows:
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
48 Rodríguez, supra note 12, at 76–77. The Biden Administration has expressed interest in
“modernizing regulatory review,” using language that acknowledges persistent criticisms, but there
are no indications that the Administration will abandon centralized review or cost-benefit analysis.
Memorandum on Modernizing Regulatory Review (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/20/modernizing-regulatory-review
[https://perma.cc/
JQH3-LNY8].
49 See generally, e.g., Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the
Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260 (2006); Rena Steinzor, The Case for Abolishing
Centralized White House Regulatory Review, 1 MICH. J. ENV’T. & ADMIN. L. 209 (2012); Jim
Tozzi, OIRA’s Formative Years: The Historical Record of Centralized Regulatory Review Preceding
OIRA’s Founding, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 37 (2011); Murray Weidenbaum, Regulatory Process Reform,
REGULATION, Winter 1997, at 20. Since 1980, the institutional hub of this work has been the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), housed within the Office of Management and
Budget. But the White House has also exerted direct influence on agencies. See Lisa Schultz
Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the
Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 48–52 (2006).

48

HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM

[Vol. 135:39

(1) some form of centralized oversight has existed since at least the
Nixon Administration;50 (2) Presidents of both parties have embraced
it;51 and (3) although centralized oversight need not entail cost-benefit
analysis,52 in the U.S. context, this has been its most prominent decisional framework.53 To be sure, there have been variations in how different administrations have implemented cost-benefit analysis, and “impurification” has appeared over time.54 But, to borrow the words of
former “regulatory czar” Professor Cass Sunstein: “The American administrative state has become a cost-benefit state . . . .”55
Centralized review is in tension with democracy, even apart from
cost-benefit analysis. As Professors Lisa Schultz Bressman and Michael
Vandenbergh argue, drawing on interviews with top environmental protection officials in different presidential administrations, agency officials
are arguably the most politically accountable and responsive to the
American public, and yet centralized review routinely overrides their
judgments.56 Yes, the results of centralized review may reflect input
from particularly impacted members of the public, but empirical research raises concerns that, in practice, the most powerful interests tend
to be the ones that receive a hearing at this level.57 Centralized review
also poses transparency problems. Studies suggest that White House
involvement in agency decisionmaking has seldom been open to public
view,58 despite longstanding expressions of concern.59 Disclosure requirements technically apply to the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), but those requirements are limited in scope
and have been imperfectly observed.60 Today, many citizens have no
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
50 Tozzi, supra note 49, at 44. Tozzi argues that the roots of centralized regulatory review go
even deeper, to the review of Army Corps of Engineers regulations during the Johnson
Administration. Id. at 42–43.
51 Steinzor, supra note 49, at 238–60.
52 Cf. Rodríguez, supra note 12, at 76 (“Recognizing persistent presidentialism does not require
unthinking acceptance of its tenets, such as cost-benefit analysis, in their current form.”).
53 Susan E. Dudley, Milestones in the Evolution of the Administrative State, DÆDALUS,
Summer 2021, at 33, 41–42.
54 Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, Working Themselves Impure: A Life Cycle Theory of
Legal Theories, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1819, 1865–67 (2016) (describing President Obama’s efforts to
incorporate into the methodology values like “equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive impacts,” id. at 1867).
55 Cass R. Sunstein, Some Costs & Benefits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, DÆDALUS, Summer
2021, at 208, 208; see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF
REGULATORY PROTECTION, at ix–xi (2002).
56 Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 49, at 83–84.
57 Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law, 92 TEX.
L. REV. 1137, 1175 (2014).
58 Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 49, at 78–82.
59 See, e.g., Morton Rosenberg, Beyond the Limits of Executive Power: Presidential Control of
Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 80 MICH. L. REV. 193, 234–47 (1981).
60 Farber & O’Connell, supra note 57, at 1184.
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idea what OIRA is or who runs it.61 Those who are better informed
recognize OIRA as secretive and largely insulated from public
oversight.62
The cost-benefit framework that has long animated centralized review is also in tension with democracy. To be sure, one can cast the rise
of cost-benefit analysis as a democratically inspired response to economic crisis. But as Professors Jedediah Britton-Purdy, David Singh
Grewal, Amy Kapczyinski, and K. Sabeel Rahman persuasively argue,
there is also a more political or ideological story, in which critics of the
New Deal order sought to alter the location and basis for “judgments
about distribution and economic ordering.”63 Such decisions must be
shielded from the “political,” these critics argued, and placed in the
hands of hardheaded technicians (that is, economists); via market-based
models of decisionmaking, they would make sure that agencies pursued
their statutory mandates in the most efficient way.64 In other words, the
embrace of cost-benefit analysis is at least in part a reflection of dissatisfaction with previous “judgments about distribution and economic ordering” and of fears about where democracy would lead without technocratic oversight.
If democracy is our evaluative criterion, there are also concerns
about how cost-benefit analysis has operated in practice. There are live
debates regarding who has tended to benefit from executive branch costbenefit analysis and whether these results deviate from democratic judgments.65 Less debatable is a critique that Professor Lisa Heinzerling,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
61 Leif Fredrickson, Perspective, The Federal Agency that Few Americans Have Heard
of and Which We All Need to Know, WASH. POST (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2017/09/28/the-federal-agency-that-few-americanshave-heard-of-and-which-we-all-need-to-know [https://perma.cc/ZU5P-WVA8] (“The Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) is foreign to most Americans. It had no cameos in ‘The
West Wing’ or ‘House of Cards,’ and rarely makes news headlines.”)
62 Bagley & Revesz, supra note 49, at 1282. A full evaluation of centralized review is beyond
the scope of this essay. We acknowledge other arguments in its favor, such as its ability to resolve
interagency conflict.
63 Jedediah Britton-Purdy, David Singh Grewal, Amy Kapczynski & K. Sabeel Rahman,
Building a Law-and-Political-Economy Framework: Beyond the Twentieth-Century Synthesis, 129
YALE L.J. 1784, 1811 (2020); see also id. at 1811–12.
64 Id.
65 See, e.g., Bagley & Revesz, supra note 49, at 1269 (arguing that “OIRA’s use of cost-benefit
review operates as a one-way ratchet,” allowing “[l]ax agency regulations” to emerge “unscathed,”
while posing serious risks to “more stringent rules”); Britton-Purdy, Grewal, Kapczynski & Rahman,
supra note 63, at 1823–24 (“Through its elevation of wealth as an orienting public value, it has
reinforced a very non-neutral drift toward elite control of government . . . .”); John D. Graham,
Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 398, 494 (2008)
(arguing that as to OIRA’s review of “lifesaving regulations,” id. at 398, the “evidence for systematic
bias” in such regulation is “weak,” id. at 494); Zachary Liscow, Is Efficiency Biased?, 85 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1649, 1650–58 (2018) (arguing that if one applies cost-benefit analysis in the way that economists urge, the policies that appear most efficient will also tend to be biased towards the rich and
against the poor); Richard L. Revesz, Regulation and Distribution, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1489, 1498
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among others, voices: even in presidential administrations that have invited a softer and arguably more humane version of cost-benefit
analysis, the dominance of this methodology has resulted in administrators imposing a market logic on problems that democratic citizens likely
would not want to cede to that framework (for example, the problem of
prison rape).66 Similarly, Professors Daniel Farber and Anne Joseph
O’Connell find “at least some reason to think that OIRA can sometimes
demand consideration of cost-benefit analysis even under statutes where
the decision must be based on other factors.”67 Finally, cost-benefit analysis is vulnerable to the same critique as centralized review more generally: despite arguments that cost-benefit analysis “promotes
accountability and transparency” and thereby serves democracy,68 much
of the analytical work occurs behind closed doors. Citizens can attempt
to influence the inputs but have no meaningful role in the subsequent
calculus.
To sum up our argument so far, we think Rodríguez is correct to see
democracy at work in her vision of presidential primacy, but we also
find reason to ask whether presidential primacy is the best that democratic citizens can hope for. We turn now to other considerations that
help us understand presidential primacy’s appeal, as well as its implications for democratic governance.
II. PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
As Rodríguez defends concerted, Executive-led “regime change,” she
wisely notes some contingencies: “[T]he tools a given President and his
regime have available or feel well placed to exploit will depend a lot on
the distribution of power across the branches as a whole, as well as the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
(2018) (noting that the executive branch currently lacks tools for evaluating the significance of distributional claims and proposing a framework for remedying this problem); Melissa J. Luttrell &
Jorge Roman-Romero, Regulatory (In)Justice: Racism and CBA Review, Y.J. REG. NOTICE &
COMMENT BLOG (Oct. 27, 2020), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/regulatory-injustice-racism-andcba-review-by-melissa-j-luttrell-and-jorge-roman-romero [https://perma.cc/4AXZ-5XMY] (arguing
that cost-benefit analysis “maintains and worsens . . . racially inequitable disparities”).
66 Lisa Heinzerling, Cost-Benefit Jumps the Shark, GEO. L. FAC. BLOG (June 13, 2012)
https://gulcfac.typepad.com/georgetown_university_law [https://perma.cc/Z52W-XYLC]; see also
FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 1–12 (2005); cf. David Singh Grewal & Jedediah
Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 2014, at 1, 3–4
(“Democratic citizens tend to hold a set of expectations about economic and political life that may
go beyond or even contradict market logic: for instance, a reasonable level of economic opportunity,
distributive fairness, workplace security, community and solidarity, and civic equality.”).
67 Farber & O’Connell, supra note 57, at 1168.
68 Dudley, supra note 53 at 40 (quoting OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, REGULATORY IMPACT
ANALYSIS: A PRIMER 2 (2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/
inforeg/regpol/circular-a-4_regulatory-impact-analysis-a-primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CZB-LVE8]).
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place the new regime occupies in history . . . .”69 Taking inspiration from
this passage, this Part attempts to historicize presidential primacy itself,
including Rodríguez’s nuanced iteration of it.
A natural starting point is then-Professor Elena Kagan’s famous
Presidential Administration, which appeared two decades ago in the
pages of this law review. It described a mode of administrative governance that gives primacy to the President and defended that model as
more “energetic” and “democratic” than its predecessors, including congressional and judicial supervision.70 In retrospect, the argument was
clearly a product of its time — Kagan drew her case studies of effective
governance entirely from the Clinton Administration, which she served
in various capacities, and she conceded that presidential administration
was especially attractive during periods of congressional gridlock, like
those that began with the Gingrich Revolution in 1994.71 But her article’s confident tone made presidential administration seem obvious and
natural — as if modern conditions required it.72
Rodríguez’s Foreword shares many of Kagan’s normative conclusions but, drawing on the lessons of intervening decades (and presumably, Rodríguez’s experience in the Obama Administration), it innovates
in important ways. For example, attentive to fears of creeping authoritarianism, Rodríguez emphasizes that concerted executive action does
not require an all-powerful President or a highly centralized government.73 Acknowledging concerns about intractable officials in some corners of the administrative state (such as immigration agents at the southern border), she highlights the “need for politically accountable officials
to provide a counterweight.”74 In the wake of a presidential administration that seemed to devalue bureaucratic expertise, she casts such expertise as a necessary complement, rather than solely an antagonist, to
political control.75
One can learn from history, however, while also being caught in its
currents. This Part highlights historical developments that have shaped
the operation and implications of presidential primacy in ways that give
us pause, even as we admire the internal improvements that Rodríguez
has made to this model. To be clear, there is much we could discuss
here, or discuss more fully.76 Given space constraints and the issue’s
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
69
70
71
72
73

Rodríguez, supra note 12, at 56 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
Kagan, supra note 19, at 2251–52, 2341, 2350.
See id. at 2282-2284.
Id. at 2246 (“We live today in an era of presidential administration.”).
Rodríguez, supra note 12, at 76–77 (noting the compatibility of her model with “strengthening
the civil service,” id. at 76, and diffusing power to state and local governments). But see id. at 70
(“The picture I have presented thus far does require appetite for some centralization and high-level
direction within the administrative state.”).
74 Id. at 76.
75 Id. at 75–76.
76 Perhaps most obviously, the rise of political polarization.

52

HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM

[Vol. 135:39

focus, we have limited ourselves to two historical developments that implicate the Supreme Court and that are visible in the 2020 Term: (1) the
rise of doctrines that show disregard for Congress’s administration and
enforcement choices, in ways that naturally funnel power toward the
executive branch; and (2) the continued unfurling of a “new federalism,”
which has combined with a deregulatory rights jurisprudence to affect
the type of partnerships different “regimes” will encounter. In some
ways, each of these developments helps explain the attraction of presidential administration; each also raises concerns about the limits of what
even an energetic presidency can do.
A. The Decline of Private Enforcement
Governance entails making judgments about the kind of life that the
“law on the books” should have. Rodríguez makes her case for an energetic Executive at a moment when Congress’s ability to do that kind of
governance work is at a historic low. One obvious reason for the ebb is
that the Supreme Court has limited the tools Congress can use to control
federal agencies. In 1983, for example, the Court eliminated the legislative veto.77 More recently, the Court has expanded the President’s authority to remove agency officials78 and thereby constrained Congress’s
ability to insulate agencies from political interference.
During the same time period, the Court undermined another way in
which Congress has tried to control the life of its laws: by enabling private citizens to enforce their statutory rights in court rather than making
them rely exclusively on public enforcement officials.
With the distance of time, it is clear that the rise of private enforcement is one of the most important legal-historical developments of the
twentieth century. According to political scientist Sean Farhang, the
late 1960s and the following decades brought “an utterly unmistakable
explosion of private lawsuits filed to enforce federal statutes.”79 This
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
77 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983). The Congressional Review Act of 1996, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 801–808, allows Congress “to overturn final rules . . . by federal agencies.” Congressional Review
Act: Overview and Tracking, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Apr. 15, 2021),
https://www.ncsl.org/ncsl-in-dc/publications-and-resources/congressional-review-act-overviewand-tracking.aspx [https://perma.cc/69QM-F5QE]. Congress, however, has only used the Act to
repeal seventeen rules over the last twenty-five years. Id. It remains a potential source for congressional power over rulemaking, see, e.g., Jody Freeman & Matthew Stephenson, Opinion, How
a Little-Known Law Might Help Protect the “Dreamers,” WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2021, 9:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/08/06/how-little-known-law-might-help-protectdreamers [https://perma.cc/B25B-FCVH], but the practical obstacles are significant and demand
creative navigation, see, e.g., Bridget C.E. Dooling, Into the Void: The GAO’s Role in the Regulatory
State, 70 AM. U. L. REV. 387, 387–89 (2020).
78 Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2192 (2020).
79 SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE
LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 13 (2010). The private enforcement that is our focus involves private
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trend reflects a legislative choice, Farhang underscores. In recognizing
and protecting civil rights, consumer safety, the environment, and a
range of other public concerns, Congress rejected “bureaucracy-centered
enforcement regimes”80 and instead “effectively deputized private litigants and their attorneys.”81 It did so by explicitly creating private
rights of action, as well as by authorizing prevailing plaintiffs to recover
attorney’s fees and damages (sometimes double, triple, or punitive).82
Such enforcement schemes appealed to conservatives and liberals alike.
For conservatives, such as those involved in drafting Title VII, private
enforcement was a preferred alternative to bureaucratic enforcement.83
For liberal legislators, meanwhile, such as those operating during the
Nixon Administration, private enforcement ensured that a statute’s efficacy did not depend wholly on the whims of executive branch
officials.84
Within short order, however, a countermovement against the “litigation state” emerged.
The countermovement’s strategy, explain
Professors Stephen Burbank and Sean Farhang, “was to leave substantive rights in place while retrenching the infrastructure for their private
enforcement.”85 Legislative efforts repeatedly failed (suggesting something about the democratic legitimacy of those efforts),86 but in the judiciary, the countermovement succeeded spectacularly. This occurred
through a fleet of decisions involving standing, pleading, class actions,
private rights of action, attorneys’ fees, damages, and arbitration.87 The
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
citizens suing to vindicate Congress's public commitments. It is distinct from the private enforcement regime that the Texas state legislature recently created to implement its six-week abortion
ban. Under this state-level private enforcement scheme, private actors, with no rights of their own
at stake, act as a substitute for, not a supplement to, public enforcement. They perform a function
that state officials likely could not perform under governing Supreme Court precedents. See
Sabrina Tavernise, Citizens, Not the State, Will Enforce New Abortion Law in Texas, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 2, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/09/us/abortion-law-regulations-texas.html [https://
perma.cc/3XWT-FRVT].
80 FARHANG, supra note 79, at 3; see also id. at 67.
81 Id. at 4.
82 Id.; see also id. at 27, 180–89.
83 STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE
COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION 9 (2017).
84 See FARHANG, supra note 79, at 20, 34–37.
85 BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 83, at 16; see also FARHANG, supra note 79, at 5 (describing private enforcement regimes as “a form of auto-pilot enforcement . . . that will be difficult
for . . . errant bureaucrats pursuing their own goals, to subvert”). The authors also chart efforts to
achieve retrenchment via revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and find only modest
and sporadic success. BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 83, at 66.
86 See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 83, at 18.
87 Id. at 130–91. There were also, of course, some dramatic repudiations of substantive rights.
See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000). But much of the work of retrenchment
occurred via procedure. For a striking example of such a decision, see Alexander v. Sandoval, 532
U.S. 275, 287 (2001), which refused to recognize a private right of action to enforce disparate impact
regulations promulgated under Title VI.
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result, after some four decades of judicial retrenchment, has been to
make federal law “less and less friendly, if not hostile, to the enforcement
of rights through private lawsuits.”88
The Supreme Court continued on this path in the 2020 Term, with
its decision in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez.89 The statute at issue, the
Fair Credit Reporting Act,90 is classic “litigation state”: as amended, the
Act provides a role to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau but
also allows consumers to sue for certain violations of the statute and
makes violators liable for damages and attorney’s fees.91 After a class
of over 8,000 individuals seized that opportunity, accusing TransUnion
of “fail[ing] to use reasonable procedures to ensure the accuracy of their
credit files” and, in some cases, “provid[ing] misleading credit reports to
third-party businesses”92 (specifically, a notice that the consumer was on
a “terrorist list”93), the Supreme Court held that most of the class members lacked Article III standing because they could not show a concrete
harm.94
It was a sharp repudiation of Congress, as Justice Thomas’s dissent
underscores: “[D]espite Congress’ judgment that such misdeeds deserve
redress, the majority decides that TransUnion’s actions are so insignificant that the Constitution prohibits consumers from vindicating their
rights in federal court.”95 Justice Thomas also highlighted just how significantly the majority’s reasoning would constrain Congress, should it
seek to allow private enforcement of new rights going forward.
Suddenly, Congress was “constitutionally precluded from creating legal
rights enforceable in federal court if those rights deviate too far from
their common-law roots.”96 The result was ironic: “In the name of protecting the separation of powers . . . this Court has relieved the legislature of its power to create and define rights.”97
The decades-long enervation of the litigation state, visible in
TransUnion, connects directly to the kind of energetic, Executive-led
governance that the Foreword envisions. In a world where statutes give
rights, but citizens can’t enforce those rights on their own (in spite of a
legal culture that equates this practice with justice itself), pressure will
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
88 BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 83, at 219; see also Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the
Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183, 185–88; Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives
to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782, 782–85 (2011).
89 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021).
90 15 U.S.C. § 1681–1681x.
91 TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2200–01.
92 Id. at 2200.
93 Id. at 2201.
94 Id. at 2212–13.
95 Id. at 2214 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
96 Id. at 2221.
97 Id.; see also Rodríguez, supra note 12, at 134 n.524.
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shift to the executive branch and the administrative state.98 Energetic
executive branch leadership will seem all the more necessary, both for
those who want to see rights vindicated and those who want to see particular rights underenforced or delegitimized (such that they are no
longer “rights” at all).99
There are important opportunities here for responsiveness — for administrators to hear democratic citizens in ways that other governmental
actors do not — but there is peril here, as well. As the builders of the
“litigation state” understood, it is not ideal for democracy when Congress
declares rights only to have those rights ebb and flow with changes in
political administrations.100 Yes, administrative control over rights enforcement offers vital opportunities for the (statutorily constrained) elaboration of rights, in ways that may facilitate democratic inclusion.101
But one should also acknowledge the democratic potential of private
litigation, especially when leveled at public institutions,102 and register
that loss. The decline of private enforcement also raises the possibility
that congressionally articulated rights will suffer atrophy or neglect, as
rights enforcement gets channeled down a path that was never meant
to be the only route to justice.103 Before long, even the basic guarantees
of democratic citizenship may start to seem fragile and entirely political.
And the stakes of presidential elections will grow even higher.104
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
98 See Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Overreach and Innovation in Equality Regulation, 66 DUKE L.J.
1771, 1771–73 (2017) (associating agencies’ increasing efforts to advance inclusion (circa 2017) with
a recognition of “the limits of private enforcement and judicial remedies in addressing contemporary
problems of exclusion,” id. at 1773); see also Lynda G. Dodd, The Future of Private Enforcement of
Civil Rights, in THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION REVISITED 322, 322–26 (Lynda G. Dodd ed., 2018)
(listing the “wide range of innovative unilateral actions” that the Obama administration took as it
became clear that the executive branch was the most viable forum for advancing civil rights).
99 For an example of this phenomenon, consider the ongoing battles over administrative interpretations of Title IX. See Karen M. Tani, An Administrative Right to Be Free from Sexual
Violence? Title IX Enforcement in Historical and Institutional Perspective, 66 DUKE L.J. 1847,
1848–54 (2017).
100 To stick with the Title IX example, consider the significant differences between the Obama
Administration’s approach to sexual violence and the Trump Administration’s. Greta Anderson,
U.S. Publishes New Regulations on Campus Sexual Assault, INSIDE HIGHER ED (May 7, 2020),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/05/07/education-department-releases-final-title-ixregulations [https://perma.cc/76YF-6QSG].
101 Samuel R. Bagenstos, This Is What Democracy Looks Like: Title IX and the Legitimacy of
the Administrative State, 118 MICH. L. REV. 1053, 1054–55 (2020) (book review); Johnson, supra
note 98, at 1776–77.
102 Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation
Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1016–21 (2004).
103 Cf. KAREN E. HOLT, WHEN OFFICIALS CLASH: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS OF INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT 2–3 (1998) (describing the Reagan
Administration’s relatively lax approach to enforcing the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons
Act, which had grown more important amidst declining opportunities for disabled, institutionalized
individuals to pursue their rights in court).
104 Private enforcement is, of course, no panacea. See, e.g., Eloise Pasachoff, Special Education,
Poverty, and the Limits of Private Enforcement, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413, 1414 (2011). Our
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B. “Administrative States” and the Tilt of Constitutional Law
Another historical development that we see as relevant is the “new
federalism” jurisprudence that unfurled, often via 5–4 Supreme Court
decisions, in the last several decades of the twentieth century and that
continues to reverberate today.105 It protects the states from what critics
see as unfair conscription into federal government visions of the public
good. Congress is the target of much of this doctrine.106 Via the revival
of the Tenth107 and Eleventh Amendments,108 as well as the narrowing
of Congress’s power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,109
the Commerce Clause,110 and, eventually, the Spending Clause,111 the
Supreme Court steadily curbed Congress’s ability to shape state government behavior (and enhanced the federal judiciary’s authority in the
process).112 The “clear statement rule” that the Court has applied to
cooperative federalism schemes113 has had a similar affect.114
These changes unfolded alongside (and were fueled by) the rise of
ideologically cohesive and politically polarized parties, as Professor
Jessica Bulman-Pozen demonstrates. Thus, at the same time that states
gained power vis-à-vis the federal government, they often acted as appendages of the two major political parties. “Put in only slightly caricatured terms,” Bulman-Pozen wrote in 2014, “Republican-led states
challenge the federal government when it is controlled by Democrats,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
point is simply that where a law contemplates public and private enforcement, the diminishment
of private enforcement raises the stakes of public enforcement.
105 Although Rodríguez is one of the nation’s foremost scholars on the workings of modern federalism, see, e.g., Cristina M. Rodríguez, Negotiating Conflict Through Federalism: Institutional
and Popular Perspectives, 123 YALE L.J. 2094 (2014), federalism plays a relatively understated role
in the Foreword. She briefly mentions the role of state governments in concerted executive action.
See, e.g., Rodríguez, supra note 12, at 77, (noting that her defense of concerted executive action is
compatible with the diffusion of power across different levels of government); id. at 106 n.399 (discussing the litigation choices of partisan state attorneys general).
106 Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Courts, Federalism, and the Federal Constitution, 1920–2000, in
3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 127, 169–70 (Michael Grossberg &
Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008).
107 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
108 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.
v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
109 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997).
110 See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. 598; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
111 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
112 See, e.g., Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 83 (2001).
113 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
114 Samuel R. Bagenstos, Spending Clause Litigation in the Roberts Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 345,
394 (2008); Brian Galle, Getting Spending: How to Replace Clear Statement Rules with Clear
Thinking About Conditional Grants of Federal Funds, 37 CONN. L. REV. 155, 157 (2004); Karen
M. Tani, The Pennhurst Doctrines and the Lost Disability History of the “New Federalism,” 110
CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 22–28) (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library).
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while Democratic-led states challenge the federal government when it is
controlled by Republicans.”115
What states did not, do, however, was solve pressing national problems — which brings us back to presidential administration and its
promise of a competent, energetic response to the nation’s greatest
threats.116
Presidential primacy is compatible with a robust role for states in
American governance, federalism scholars have argued. These scholars
note a long tradition of state officials partnering with the executive
branch117 and an emergent judicial tradition of weaving federalism concerns into administrative law.118 Today’s executive branch has a varied
set of tools for influencing states without commandeering them, including waivers, grants, and “nonpreemption” (“permit[ting] state law to
stand in areas also regulated by federal law”).119 In short, presidential
primacy has appeared to offer a coherent, national vision for addressing
big problems and the possibility of state collaboration in making that
vision a reality.120
Importantly, however, influence runs both ways. As federalism
scholars have long documented, state officials use whatever privileges
and access they have to affect the federal agenda — sometimes to the
point of open obstruction.121 Arguably, this is a good thing, because it
places a “check” on the executive branch and thereby safeguards the

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
115
116

Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1080 (2014).
Cf. Ernest A. Young, Federalism as a Check on Executive Authority: State Public Litigation,
Executive Authority, and Political Polarization, 22 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 305, 309–10 (2017–2018)
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separation of powers.122 But how should we judge the rise of presidential primacy if, in practice, the doctrines and practices of federalism now
tend to favor a particular type of presidential administration? When it
comes to states’ relationships with presidential administrations — their
ability to advance or temper a particular vision — how level is the playing field between an administration that has conservative preferences
and an administration that has more progressive or liberal
preferences?123
This question deserves careful, empirical study — more than we can
offer here — but a preliminary scan of the landscape raises concerns
about the ideological tilt of the “administrative states,” at least when it
comes to the vital domain of social welfare policy.124 Although several
states recently lost their latest bid to overturn the Affordable Care Act
(ACA),125 the states retain their right to limit the Act’s reach, by declining to expand their Medicaid programs.126 A dozen states continue to
exercise that right, with Missouri legislators attempting to do so even in
the face of a contrary voter-backed amendment to the state constitution.127 Of the states that have expanded their Medicaid programs, some
used the leverage they gained from NFIB v. Sebelius128 to demand concessions from the Department of Health and Human Services, effectively pulling statutory implementation in a more conservative and exclusionary direction.129 Looking beyond the ACA to the realm of income
support, we see how, for decades, federal legislative judgments have
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combined with federalism doctrine and state balanced budget requirements130 to incentivize “laboratories of suffering”131 rather than laboratories of human flourishing. Consider, for example, President Obama’s
attempt to use executive branch authority to mitigate some of the harshness of the 1996 welfare reform. When his Administration invited states
to seek waivers to statutory work requirements, only one state applied
and no waiver resulted.132 Now add to the picture what we know about
who speaks for “the state” in negotiations with federal officials: in some
instances, Professor Miriam Seifter finds, it is regulated entities “cloaking private agendas in the name and legitimacy of the states,”133 not
unlike how the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) has
succeeded in translating its probusiness, antiregulatory agenda into state
law.134
There are, of course, states whose current legal and policy regimes
align with a more progressive policy agenda, but importantly, they face
challenges from developments in the Supreme Court’s rights jurisprudence, as Rodríguez notes.135 The nonalarmist reading of cases like
Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid,136 Americans for Prosperity Foundation
v. Bonta,137 Fulton v. Philadelphia,138 and the various COVID-19 restrictions decisions139 is that each represents but a small incursion on
states’ police power. But as a set, these cases and their recent predecessors send a coherent message. Writing in 2015, Professor Elizabeth
Sepper noted how trends in free exercise jurisprudence appeared to invite “deregulation through exemption,” while simultaneously expanding
the class of litigants capable of demanding exemption.140 According to
Professors Cary Coglianese and Daniel E. Walters, the Court’s 9–0
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Fulton decision dramatically widens the invitation.141 Ruling in favor
of Catholic Social Services while avoiding unsettling the framework of
Employment Division v. Smith,142 the Court emphasized that the local
antidiscrimination policies at issue contained an exemption. That is,
they were not the kind of “neutral and generally applicable law” described in Smith.143 This categorization allowed the Court to limit its
strict scrutiny analysis to the City Council’s denial of an exemption —
and allowed many civil rights advocates to breathe a sigh of relief.144
According to Coglianese and Walters, however, the regulatory landscape
is rife with the possibility of exemption, exception, and waiver; “general
applicability” is less common than one would think.145 Fulton thus
“would seem to have opened the barn door for anyone with religious
objections to escape from their duty to obey vast swaths of the law.”146
Rodríguez uses the term “counter-regime” to describe this trend147:
although much of the Foreword characterizes the Supreme Court as institutionally embedded in a struggle between an Executive-led regime
and its immediate predecessor, she also recognizes this Court as “product
and avatar” of a different political regime, with roots extending back to
the Reagan Administration.148 And yet this observation, coming in Part
III of the Foreword, does not seem to shake her commitment to the vision of governance she limns in Parts I and II. We ask whether it
should — or if at least it urges a reordering of priorities for scholars like
Rodríguez, who value both democracy and good governance. If the
“rules of the game” have evolved so as to disadvantage the implementation of one type of political vision, even when that vision commands
support from a majority of voters, what are the implications of continuing to accept the game as is (while arguing that whoever is taking their
“turn” be allowed to proceed energetically and without undue interference)? At what point do we identify the game as unfair? At what point
do we give primacy to reforming the rules? And what happens to our
political and legal imaginations as we keep these questions at bay?
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III. DEMOCRATIC DECLINE: CODA OR CORE?
A final historical trend we discuss is one that Rodríguez also highlights, in a closing section titled “Coda: Who Votes and Who Counts.”149
Here, Rodríguez concedes that the vision of governance she advances
“depends on [a] crucial assumption[]: that regime change will be possible
and even regular.”150 Unfortunately, “developments within American
political culture in recent years have begun to challenge [this] assumption[] and now threaten to make democratic regime change incomplete,
elusive, asymmetrical, or even impossible.”151 The Court, Rodríguez
recognizes, has exacerbated these problems through its “skepticism of
the need for federal intervention (by Congress or the courts) to protect
the democratic process and voters themselves from racial discrimination.”152 We offer here a longer view, starting with the interbranch dynamics that once made an inclusive, racially egalitarian democracy seem
possible and then briskly reviewing how this fragile arrangement
collapsed.
Without being overly romantic about the history of American democracy, one can fairly say that circa 1966, all three branches of the
federal government were committed to a relatively egalitarian and inclusive vision. Congress had passed the Voting Rights Act153 (VRA),
which gave the executive branch a central enforcement role. The VRA’s
main enforcement mechanism — preclearance under section 5 — required jurisdictions that historically restricted the right to vote or had
low voter registration or turnout to seek approval for any changes to
their elections laws with either the Attorney General (“administrative
preclearance”) or a three-judge panel in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia (“judicial preclearance”).154 This system represented an explicit choice by Congress to subject the political process to
federal oversight, with the understanding that the executive branch and
the resources of the Department of Justice were vital to the system’s
success.155 The Supreme Court upheld preclearance under an expansive
view of congressional power under the Fifteenth Amendment.156
The last decade has revealed how precarious that achievement was.
In retrospect, the seeds of its undoing may have been planted in the
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executive branch during the first Reagan Administration. There, a
young John Roberts, then a special assistant to Attorney General
William French Smith, wrote a series of memos opposing the introduction of an effects test into the Voting Rights Act. He contended that
there “was no evidence of voting abuses nationwide supporting the
change.”157 Roberts lost that battle — in 1982, Congress enacted the
changes to the Voting Rights Act that he opposed158 — but as Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, Roberts is now winning the war.
In analyzing the relevant suite of Supreme Court decisions, it is common to see Congress’s authority as the casualty. Less appreciated, in
this era of expansive executive branch authority, is that presidential
power also took a hit.
Shelby County v. Holder159 is the most important example. There,
the Chief Justice relied on the principle of equal sovereignty — a constitutional rule of questionable historical pedigree160 — to hold section 4
of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional.161 Importantly, section 4
worked in tandem with preclearance under section 5 by identifying the
jurisdictions subject to federal supervision.162 By ruling section 4 unconstitutional, the Roberts Court turned the VRA’s preclearance regime
into a dead letter. Jurisdictions that were previously covered no longer
had to seek permission before implementing changes to voting laws.163
Predictably, without executive branch approval as a prophylactic, state
legislatures passed a raft of more restrictive laws.164 Shelby County is
thus a prime example of a problem Rodríguez only briefly mentions: the
limits of executive power given “[t]he question of congressional capacity.”165 “[I]f we believe in government problem-solving,” she continues,
this problem “is . . . a serious one,” because “the Executive will always
be constrained by the law’s limits, and its innovation will eventually run
into those limits.”166 By picking apart the VRA, the Supreme Court has
effectively extinguished presidential energy in this domain.
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The problem only deepened this past Term. In Brnovich v. DNC,167
the Court considered the proper legal standards for evaluating vote denial claims under section 2 of the VRA,168 which, following Shelby
County, became the vehicle of choice for civil rights lawyers and the
Department of Justice to challenge restrictive voting laws.169 Writing
for the majority, Justice Alito crafted what Professor Rick Hasen calls
an “impossible test,”170 one that gives the largely conservative federal
judiciary wide discretion in these cases. Notably, one of the opinion’s
guideposts instructs courts to compare new voting restrictions to those
in place in 1982, when section 2 was amended.171 This factor, as Justice
Kagan recognized in dissent, took an enforcement tool that was “meant
to disrupt the status quo” and “eradicate then-current discriminatory
practices,” and instead “set them in amber.”172
Brnovich also has immediate consequences for any ambitious plans
for executive protection of voting rights. Shortly before the Court’s decision, the Department of Justice filed a section 2 lawsuit against
Georgia for enacting S.B. 202, a law that imposed new restrictions on
the right to vote.173 Attorney General Merrick Garland called the lawsuit “the first step of many,” suggesting that section 2 would be central
to the Department’s enforcement strategy.174 The strategy looks less
promising in Brnovich’s wake. Shortly after the decision was issued,
the Department of Justice issued a statement “urg[ing] Congress to enact
additional legislation” to protect the right to vote.175 Republican State
Attorneys General, by contrast, relied heavily on Brnovich in an amicus
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brief supporting Georgia’s motion to dismiss the suit.176 These divergent responses to the decision only underline how executive power is
collateral damage in a broader war between Congress and the Court.
Brnovich thus continued down a doctrinal path that is deferential to
states, skeptical of voting rights claims, and allergic to judicial supervision of the political process. Notably, each of those trends runs in exactly the opposite direction of the modern movement for African
American freedom and the so-called Second Reconstruction (encompassing the landmark civil rights advancements of the 1950s and 1960s).177
This Second Reconstruction depended on a robust deployment of congressional power,178 a multibranch recognition of the right to vote as
fundamental,179 and judicial willingness to enter the political thicket.180
Today each of these foundations is at risk, and with it the integrity of
the democratic process as a whole.
It is an ironic story for Executive-led governance, which has arguably never been stronger and yet is enfeebled when it comes to protecting
democracy. More than that, however, it is a deeply discouraging
story — for presidential primacy and for any form of governance that
aspires to be democratic. All of these models require a majoritarian
democracy and a secure political process for their legitimacy. When the
former erodes, so does the latter. Minoritarian presidencies are now
common.181 Electoral integrity is a sharply partisan issue.182 States pass
increasingly restrictive and targeted voting laws, now seemingly blessed
by a laissez-faire Court. Given the weaponization of the political process, even the peaceful transition of power — the hallmark of even a
minimalist theory of democracy — is at risk.183
We come then, to an uncomfortable juncture. In earlier parts of our
response, we raised questions about whether a framework of presidential primacy, despite its democratic justifications, might be providing
democratic citizens less than they deserve, or at least acceding to an
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unfairly constrained understanding of the public good. Here we ask a
more fundamental question: What are the implications of advancing a
robust vision of Executive-led governance, however democratically inspired, when democracy itself is under threat and the executive branch
has lost its best tool for defending it? To what extent should Rodríguez’s
thoughtful and clear-eyed Coda temper the Foreword’s core claims?
***
We opened this Response with a quote from the historian Natalie
Zemon Davis, from an interview about her craft, politics, and ambitions:
“Especially I want to show that it could be different,” she told her interviewers, “that it was different, and that there are alternatives.”184
Rodríguez’s project, as we understand it, is to show how our constitutional system allows changes and reversal, including the recovery of
visions that a previous administration rejected. We are not stuck with
bad policy merely because a President once put the weight of the executive branch behind it. There are alternatives, and our leaders may
pursue them with as much boldness and energy as circumstances require
and the law allows.
Our Response gives the prefatory quote a different valence. We have
reminded readers that our current form of presidential primacy was not
always with us and that certain forces made it so. We have also pointed
to historical developments that have raised the stakes of presidential
primacy, while also constraining the legal and policy visions that executive branch actors can pursue. And throughout this Response, we have
tried to invite readers to remember different ways of governing and being governed. That is, we have tried to recall alternatives. Some of
these alternatives are perhaps beyond the point of recovery. But as legal
historians ranging from Risa Goluboff185 to Nate Holdren186 have argued, going back in time is not the point; the point is to rewiden our
imaginations, unsettle assumptions, and encourage new ideas.187
Rodríguez is, of course, aware of all the general concerns we have
raised. As an academic, she has written about them. As a former executive branch official, she has negotiated them. In this Foreword, she
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has understandably chosen to focus her gaze elsewhere — on how
American government can meet the urgent challenges of the day without
betraying core values. Our response is in some sense simply a reminder
of the legal and political sediment upon which Rodríguez’s energetic
executive branch actors now tread as they do the essential work of governing. Our audience is those readers who may yet wish to disrupt that
ground, searching out more fertile soil or digging out seeds of a different
future.

